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Does the Privatization of Publicly Owned
Infrastructure Implicate the Public Trust
Doctrine? Illinois Central and the Chicago
Parking Meter Concession Agreement
Ivan Kaplan*
ABSTRACT
During the nineteenth century, legislatures proved “excessively generous” in
granting railroad corporations property rights in publicly owned, commercially vital
municipal streets and harbors. Jacksonian jurists, suspicious of corporate influence,
invoked the public trust doctrine to rescind grants of privilege inconsistent with the
public interest. In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the “lodestar” of the modern
doctrine, the Supreme Court refused to recognize the Illinois legislature’s authority to
convey the submerged lands of the Chicago Harbor to a railroad corporation, a
conveyance that empowered a private enterprise to “practically control . . . for its own
profit” a publicly owned “highway” vital to Chicago’s “vast and constantly increasing
commerce.”
During the latter half of the twentieth century, courts seized on Illinois Central as a
useful tool for protecting environmentally sensitive waterways while generally ignoring a
century of caselaw applying the public trust doctrine to non-submerged infrastructure,
namely municipal streets. The latent potential of the doctrine to protect public
infrastructure from corporate monopolization remains relevant because private investors
are increasingly pursuing property rights in such assets. A prominent example is the
Chicago parking meter privatization, conveying to a Morgan Stanley subsidiary the
rights to all on-street parking meter revenues for seventy-five years.
This Note analyzes the Chicago parking meter privatization under Illinois Central,
and subsequent Illinois public trust caselaw, and concludes that the agreement represents
precisely the sort of conveyance the Illinois Central Court sought to proscribe, namely,
one that sacrifices public “management and control”1 of a highway “for commerce,
trade, and intercourse”2 essential to Chicago’s continued economic and urban
development. In the absence of judicial intervention, shortsighted state and local
governments will continue to succumb to the temptation of selling rights in vital public
infrastructure for temporary, short-term profit, in opaque, potentially corrupt
transactions, sacrificing the ability of future generations to regulate as public necessity,
safety, and welfare require.
*

Juris Doctor, 2012, Northwestern University School of Law. He wishes to thank Professor Michael Barsa
for his encouragement and the editors of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy for their
guidance.
1
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
2
Id. at 528.
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INTRODUCTION

During the nineteenth century, railroad corporations fought aggressively to acquire
property rights in the public streets and harbors of America’s burgeoning metropolises.3
Legislators, whether shortsighted, incompetent, or corrupt, proved “excessive[ly]
generous” in granting private parties rights in such assets.4 Responsibility for protecting
the jus publicum, or public interest, thus devolved to the courts, which invoked the
concept of the public trust to invalidate grants of invaluable public property. Most
prominently, in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, the “lodestar” of modern
public trust jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the Lake Front
Act of 1869, conveying the submerged lands of the Chicago Harbor to the Illinois Central
Railroad.5 Though the legislature sought to protect the public interest by significantly
conditioning the grant and extracting substantial consideration from the railroad, the
Court found the legislature exceeded its authority by abdicating “management and
control”6 over a publicly owned asset essential to the city’s “vast and constantly
increasing commerce.”7 Concurrently, courts of final appeal in New England and MidAtlantic and Southern states, employing public trust principles, found that their
legislatures exceeded their constitutional authorities by conveying property rights in
commercially vital municipal streets to private, for-profit railroads.8 The public trust
doctrine, as conceived in Illinois Central and applied by late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century courts, thus proscribed “what today would be called rent-seeking
behavior: a small, well-organized private interest procur[ing] legislation that gave it
monopoly privileges in order to extract wealth from the diffuse and unrepresented
public.”9
Today, the doctrine is virtually unrecognizable from this early conception. In 1970,
Professor Joseph Sax published a transformative law review article in which he argued,
“Of all the concepts known to American law, only the public trust doctrine seems to have
3

See MOLLY SELVIN, THIS TENDER AND DELICATE BUSINESS: THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN AMERICAN
LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY, 1789–1920 107–16 (Harold Hyman et al. eds., 1987); see also Joseph D.
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really
Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004) (detailing the efforts of the Illinois Central
Railroad Company to acquire the submerged lands of the Chicago Harbor).
4
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MICH. L. REV. 471, 489 (1970); see also Selvin, supra note 3, at 107–16.
5
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 387; see, e.g., Sax, supra note 4, at 489 (describing Illinois Central as the
“lodestar” American public trust decision, a description that has been explicitly adopted by various courts);
see also Owsichek v. State Guide, Licensing, and Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 496 (Alaska 1988) (citing the
“lodestar of American public trust law, Illinois Central”); Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d. 1025, 1027 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984) (noting that the “lodestar” of the public trust doctrine in American law is Illinois Central);
City of Berkeley v. Super. Ct. of Alameda County, 606 P.2d 362, 365 (Cal. 1980) (describing Illinois
Central as a seminal case); In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 440 (Haw.
2000) (describing Illinois Central as a seminal case); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club,
Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Idaho 1983) (describing Illinois Central as a seminal case).
6
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453.
7
Id. at 454.
8
See, e.g., Story v. N.Y. Elevated R.R. Co., 90 N.Y. 122 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1882); Lahr v. Metro. Elevated Ry.
Co., 10 N.E. 528 (N.Y. 1887); Pa. R.R. Co. v. Miller, 132 U.S. 75 (1889); Jones v. Erie and Wyo. Valley
R.R. Co., 25 A. 134 (Pa. 1892); Griffin v. Shreveport and Ark. RR. Co., 6 So. 624 (La. 1889); Costigan v.
Pa. R.R. Co., 23 A. 810 (N.J. 1892).
9
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 805.
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the breadth and substantive content that might make it useful as a tool . . . [for addressing
natural] resource management problems.”10 In the decades since, courts have proved
receptive to this charge, overwhelmingly construing the doctrine as natural resources
law.11 Whereas Illinois Central sought to protect a navigable, commercially vital,
municipal harbor from corporate monopolization, courts have since expanded the
doctrine to encompass commercially insignificant, nonnavigable waterways, and
environmental, scenic, and recreational interests.12 In thus construing the doctrine, courts
have generally ignored, without specifically rejecting, a body of caselaw, beginning in
the mid-nineteenth century and continuing into the twentieth, invoking the doctrine to
protect the public character of municipal streets.13
The latent potential of the doctrine to proscribe economically destructive or
monopolistic control of vital public infrastructure, as demonstrated in Illinois Central,
remains relevant because “small, well-organized private [parties]” are increasingly
pursuing ownership interests in public streets, highways, and harbors:
Reeling from more exotic investments that imploded during the credit
crisis, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, the Carlyle Group, Goldman Sachs,
Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse are among the investors who have
amassed an estimated $250 billion war chest—much of it raised in the last
two years—to finance a tidal wave of infrastructure projects in the United
States and overseas.14
[B]anks and private investment firms have fallen in love with public
infrastructure. They're smitten by the rich cash flows that roads, bridges,
airports, parking garages, and shipping ports generate—and the
monopolistic advantages that keep those cash flows as steady as a beating
heart.15
While the private sector scours for infrastructure investments, states and
municipalities struggle to balance budgets ravaged by “the steepest decline in state tax
10

See Sax, supra note 4, at 474, 489–90 (arguing Illinois Central contains “the central substantive thought”
of public trust litigation).
11
See generally THOMAS MERRILL & HENRY SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 332 (2007);
CHRISTINE KLEIN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES
618 (2nd ed. 2009).
12
See, e.g., KLEIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 618–78.
13
See infra text accompanying note 150.
14
Jenny Anderson, Cities Debate Privatizing Public Infrastructure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2008,
www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/business/27fund.html.
15
Emily Thornton, Roads To Riches: Why Investors Are Clamoring to Take Over America's Highways,
Bridges, and Airports—And Why the Public Should Be Nervous, BUSINESSWEEK, May 7, 2007,
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_19/b4033001.htm. In such transactions, the private investor
pays the owner, whether a state, municipality, or other public entity, a single, upfront fee, which amounts to
essentially the asset’s sale price. In return, the state forfeits its rights to revenues derived from the publicly
owned, now encumbered asset, and agrees to compensate the investor for actions that impair its
profitability. Such investments differ markedly from mere operating agreements in which the state
outsources a traditionally public service to a private concessionaire. In such transactions, the state pays the
private party, not vice-versa; retaining the concessionaire only for his services, the state maintains
regulatory control over the publicly owned property. Conversely, in infrastructure investment transactions,
the investor, as de facto owner, generally hires his own concessionaire to operate and maintain the asset.
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receipts on record.”16 In the wake of the financial crisis, “[s]tates will continue to struggle
to find the revenue needed to support critical public services . . . for a number of years.”17
Amidst such uncertainty, the municipal bond market has demanded substantial premiums
for accepting the risk of lending to struggling state and local governments, exacerbating
their precarious financial positions. In fact, the crisis is motivating speculation of an
impending “tsunami of municipal bankruptcies and defaults.”18 As a consequence, states
and municipal governments confront the overwhelming temptation of entering into
privatization agreements with Wall Street institutions “in order to receive large, upfront
payments that solve short-term financial problems . . . .”19 Ironically, the financial crisis
that precipitated these unprecedented reductions in tax revenues, motivating states and
municipalities to explore infrastructure privatization, was “caused by widespread failures
in government regulation, corporate mismanagement and heedless risk-taking by Wall
Street.”20
Under Mayor Richard Daley, the City of Chicago pioneered municipal
infrastructure privatization.21 In 2005, the city leased the Chicago Skyway, a 7.8-mile
city-owned expressway, for ninety-nine years to private investors for $1.83 billion.22 In
2006, the city leased four city-owned parking garages, partially beneath public streets, for
ninety-nine years to Morgan Stanley for $563 million.23 In 2008, the City Council
approved a ninety-nine year lease of city-owned Midway Airport to a private consortium
for $2.5 billion.24
Most recently, the city entered into a seventy-five-year non-possessory lease and
license conveying an exclusive right to revenues from 36,161 city-owned on-street
16

Nicholas Johnson et al., State Tax Changes in Response to the Recession, CTR. ON BUDGET POLICIES &
PRIORITIES (Mar. 8, 2010), www.cbpp.org/files/3-8-10sfp.pdf.
17
Elizabeth McNichol et al., States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact, CTR. ON BUDGET POLICIES &
PRIORITIES (Feb. 11, 2011), www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=711.
18
See, e.g., David Wessel, Local Debts Defy Easy Solution, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704814204575507842266619222.html (acknowledging,
but ultimately dismissing, such predictions).
19
Report of Inspector General’s Findings and Recommendations: An Analysis of the Lease of the City’s
Parking Meters, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, 2 (June 2, 2009),
www.chicagoinspectorgeneral.org/pdf/IGO-CMPS-20090602.pdf [hereinafter Report of Inspector
General].
20
Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011,
www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/business/economy/26inquiry.html.
21
See, e.g., Mick Dumke, Mayor Daley Pitches Chicago in Asia, but Who Is Buying?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/us/14cncpulse.html. In fact, the former chief financial officer for
the City of Chicago, Dana R. Levenson, is “one of the movement’s biggest champions.” Thornton, supra
note 15. Prior to serving as Chicago’s CFO, he worked as an investment banker for Banc One and Bank of
America. Upon leaving the city’s employ, he accepted a position as a managing director for Royal Bank of
Scotland Group, where “he now beats the bushes for infrastructure deals.” Id.
22
Richard M. Daley’s 22 Years as Mayor, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 2011,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ct-met-daley-timeline-specialsection20110430,0,870437.story?page=1.
23
Yvette Shields, Chicago Approves Garage Deal: $563M Lease Sparks Threat of Injunction, THE BOND
BUYER, Nov. 2, 2006, http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/-258093-1.html.
24
Paul Merrion, Midway Airport Privatization in Holding Pattern, CHI. BUS., Feb. 1, 2010,
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20100201/NEWS02/200036929. While the city council approved
the transaction, the buyer’s financing collapsed in the wake of the financial crisis, and thus, the airport
remains under municipal control. Id.
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metered parking and garage spaces to Chicago Parking Meters, LLC, a subsidiary of
investment bank Morgan Stanley.25 In return, the city received a single, upfront payment
of $1.15 billion.26 The grant, codified in the Chicago Parking Meter System Concession
Agreement (“Concession Agreement”),27 requires the city to compensate Morgan Stanley
for “any action or actions at any time” which materially affect the market value of
Morgan Stanley’s interest, including the exercise of the city’s “reserved powers” to
regulate the public rights-of-way as public necessity, safety, and welfare require.28
At the time of its enactment, the Chicago Parking Meter privatization was
unprecedented among U.S. cities. In the fall of 2010, however, the Indianapolis City
Council approved a fifty year, $620 million lease of the city’s parking meters to private
investors.29 Recently, New York City solicited parking meter privatization proposals

25

See J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHIC., ILL., Dec. 4, 2008,
www.chicityclerk.com/journals/2008/dec4_2008/120408_SP.pdf [hereinafter J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY
COUNCIL]. The agreement conveyed a grant from the city for the right to “operate, maintain and improve
the Metered Parking System, [and] to retain the revenues to be derived from the operation of the
Concession Metered Parking Spaces.” Id. at 50527. While the contract consists of both a “non-possessory
lease” and a “license,” Morgan Stanley, in its own financial statements, refers to the Concession Agreement
as a “lease.” Specifically, the 2009 audited financial statements state, “[Morgan Stanley] leased the System
for a 75-year term from the City of Chicago . . . for a purchase price of $1,151,355,186.” Chicago Parking
Meters, LLC, Financial Statements and Schedule, Feb. 28, 2010, at 6, available at
www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/fin/supp_info/AssetLeaseAgreements/MeteredParking/Park
ingMetersLLCFinancialStatement2010.pdf.
26
See J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 50508.
27
Dan Mihalopoulos & Hal Dardick, Aldermen Approve Chicago Parking Meter Lease, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 4,
2008, 11:45 AM), newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/2008/12/aldermen-deba-1.html; see also J. OF
THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 50527.
28
This proposition is derived from the Concession Agreement’s definition of: Adverse Action (“An
‘Adverse Action’ shall occur if the City . . . takes any action or actions at any time during the Term
(including enacting any Law) and the effect of such action or actions, individually or in the aggregate, is
reasonably expected (i) to be principally borne by the Concessionaire or other operators of on-street
metered parking systems and (ii) to have a material adverse effect on the fair market value of the
Concessionaire Interest . . .”), J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 50618–19;
Compensation Event (“‘Compensation Event’ means . . . the occurrence of an Adverse Action or the
occurrence of any other event that under the terms of this Agreement explicitly requires the payment of
Concession Compensation”), Id. at 50533; Concession Compensation (“Concession Compensation’ means
compensation payable by the City to the Concessionaire in order to restore the Concessionaire to same
economic position the Concessionaire would have enjoyed if the applicable Compensation Event had not
occurred”), id.; Reserved Powers (“‘Reserved Powers’ means the exercise by the City of . . . police and
regulatory powers with respect to Metered Parking Spaces”), id. at 50549; and Reserved Powers Adverse
Action Compensation (“[T]here may be circumstances when the exercise by the City of its Reserved
Powers may have a material adverse effect on the fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest . . . and
that under such circumstances the Concessionaire may seek compensation with respect thereto (the
‘Reserved Powers Adverse Action Compensation’)”), id. at 50621. For more complete definitions of these
provisions, see infra Appendix.
29
Caitlin Devitt, Indianapolis Plan to Lease City's Parking Meters Wins Approval, AM. BANKER, Nov. 17,
2010, at 28. Also in fall 2010, the Pittsburgh City Council considered, but ultimately rejected, a $451
million parking meter privatization proposed by investment bank J.P. Morgan. Kris B. Mamula, Pittsburgh
Considers New Parking Plan, PITTSBURGH BUS. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2010,
www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/news/2010/12/28/pittsburgh-considers-new-parking-plan.html.
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from investment banks, hoping to net $5 billion.30 Washington, D.C. is reportedly
following suit.31
This Note analyzes the Parking Meter Concession Agreement under the public trust
doctrine, as articulated in Illinois Central and modern Illinois code and caselaw. Parts I
and II review, respectively, the Illinois Central dispute and decision and the Concession
Agreement’s substantive provisions and process of enactment. Part III analyzes the
validity of the Concession Agreement under Illinois Central.32 On the surface, such an
analysis may seem absurd; today, courts overwhelmingly apply Illinois Central to
submerged lands, not municipal streets. To this end, subpart III(A) surveys the history of
the doctrine in Roman, English, and early American law, demonstrating its historical
application to municipal streets and placing the Court’s 1892 Illinois Central opinion in
context. Subpart III(B) analyzes the language of the opinion for evidence of this history,
demonstrating the Court contemplated a rule applicable not only to Chicago’s municipal
harbor but to the city’s “streets, alleys, [and] ways.” Having established the Courtconsidered municipal streets in Illinois public trust property, subpart III(C) analyzes the
Concession Agreement under the rules governing the disposition of such property
announced in Illinois Central, ultimately concluding that the conveyance violates the
fundamental policy principles motivating the Court.
In Part IV, the Note transitions from a discussion of Illinois Central to the practical
application of the public trust doctrine to the Concession Agreement litigation. The
analysis begins by noting that the Concession Agreement itself specifically acknowledges
that the city administers Chicago’s public ways in accordance with the public trust
doctrine.33 This provision is consistent with the Illinois Plat Act, which states that
municipal streets are held in public trust.34 The analysis continues by applying modern
Illinois public trust law to the Concession Agreement, including a 1993 decision in which
the Illinois Supreme Court prohibited municipalities from exercising “proprietary
powers” over public streets, “rent[ing] or leas[ing] parts, or all, of a public street,” or
using “public streets [primarily] as revenue-producing property. . . .”35
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO ILLINOIS CENTRAL
In his seminal article on the American public trust doctrine, Professor Joseph Sax
writes that Illinois Central contains the “central substantive thought of public trust
30

See Andrew Grossman, City on the Prowl for Cash, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2011, at A17; David Seifman,
City Mulls $5b Meter Sell-off, N.Y. POST, Oct. 4, 2010,
www.nypost.com/p/news/local/city_mulls_meter_sell_off_53FEAGOGzvBfxQuXDs5JZL.
31
See Michael Neibauer, A New Direction for D.C.'s Parking Meters?, WASH. BUS. J., Dec. 14, 2010,
www.bizjournals.com/washington/blog/2010/12/a-new-direction-for-dcs-parking.html.
32
The public trust doctrine undoubtedly imposes prohibitions applicable to all states; nonetheless, the
doctrine is generally construed as state law. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 11, at 323. (“Justice Field
never says whether he is applying federal law or state law in Illinois Central. In subsequent public trust
decisions, the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that the doctrine is grounded in state law . . . .
[But] there have been recurrent attempts to argue that the trust is in fact grounded in federal law.”) Id. For
the purposes of this Note, however, this discussion is irrelevant; regardless of whether Illinois Central
applies federal or state law, the opinion is binding upon Illinois.
33
See J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 50576.
34
Plat Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/3 (West 2010).
35
See AT&T Co. v. Arlington Heights, 620 N.E.2d 1040, 1049, 1044, 1047 (Ill. 1993).
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litigation.”36 Likewise, Professors Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill note in their
influential study of Illinois Central, “[a]lthough proponents and detractors of the public
trust doctrine dispute much, all agree that the leading case establishing the doctrine in the
United States—the ‘lodestar’ of the modern public trust doctrine—is the United States
Supreme Court’s 1892 decision in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois.”37
A. Facts
Reviewing the facts underlying the Illinois Central dispute is essential to
understanding the Court’s Illinois Central decision because “the facts of the case—or at
least highly stylized versions of them—have been repeatedly invoked in modern cases
and commentary as a justification for the very existence of the public trust doctrine.”38 As
presented by commentators, and as evidenced in Justice Field’s opinion, “Those facts
assume the form of a classical cautionary tale: a corrupt, or at least exceedingly shortsighted, legislature transferred invaluable natural resources to a small but influential
interest group, with no identifiable benefit to the public at large.”39 As Professors Merrill
and Kearny discovered in their investigation, however, this caricature lacks the nuance
and complexity of reality.
In 1869, the Illinois legislature enacted the Lake Front Act conveying to the Illinois
Central Railroad the fee simple title to “something more than a thousand acres” of
submerged lands within the Chicago Harbor40 and several acres of non-submerged land in
north Lake Park,41 consisting of contemporary Millennium Park.42 In return, the Act
required the railroad to remit $800,000 for north Lake Park and seven percent of gross
receipts from any leases in the harbor in perpetuity for the submerged lands.43 In addition,
the railroad agreed to build a breakwater, a capital-intensive infrastructure improvement
beyond the city’s means.44
The submerged lands conveyed in the Lake Front Act were undeveloped and idle.
In 1869, the city’s bustling commercial port facilities were not in the Chicago Harbor, but
on the Chicago River;45 the conveyance codified in the Act, however, excluded “the
entirety of the existing harbor facilities located along the Chicago River.”46 Accordingly,
“[t]he Lake Front Act did not create a giant monopoly” over the city’s commercial port
facilities;47 rather, the Act empowered the Illinois Central Railroad to dictate, and
potentially delay, development of a proposed port in the Chicago Harbor, which was
intended to ease congestion on the Chicago River. The north Lake Park property
conveyed by the Lake Front Act was equally idle; the property was “almost useless as a
pleasure-ground. In fact its only public utility ha[d] been that of a dumping-place for
36

Joseph L. Sax, supra note 4, at 490.
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 800.
38
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 803.
39
Id.
40
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 454 (1892).
41
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 801.
42
Id. at 900.
43
Id. at 809 n.45.
44
Id. at 819–20.
45
Id. at 881.
46
Id.
47
Id.
37
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cellar excavations, street-sweepings, coal-ashes and other refuse material.”48 Nonetheless,
by virtue of its location, the property commanded a substantial price.49
In selling the submerged lands of the Chicago Harbor and the pleasure grounds of
north Lake Park, the legislature sought to protect the public interest by reserving for the
state specific rights in the conveyed properties. For instance, the Act provided “nothing
herein contained shall authorize obstructions to the Chicago Harbor, or impair the public
right of navigation,”50 significantly qualifying the railroad’s right to exclude. Moreover,
the Act reserved for the state the right to regulate rates charged by Illinois Central
Railroad for the use of harbor facilities,51 a reservation which effectively undermined
Illinois Central’s ability to extract monopoly profits. Finally, the Act prohibited Illinois
Central from granting, selling or conveying, in perpetuity, the submerged lands of the
Chicago Harbor, further qualifying the railroad’s property rights.52 Such qualifications,
intended to protect the state’s interests, motivated the Illinois Central dissent, which
argued, “the Lake Front Act had prohibited the railroad from interfering with the public
right of navigation and had preserved the power of the State to regulate the railroad’s
construction of improvements in the harbor.”53
Despite the legislature’s efforts to retain some semblance of regulatory control over
the conveyed properties, the citizens of Chicago overwhelmingly opposed the Lake Front
Act, popularly dubbed the “Lake Front Steal.”54 The Chicago Tribune, for instance,
warned of invaluable public property “pass[ing] into the hands of a Wall [S]treet
corporation.”55 Newspapers “saw the matter largely as a question of the adequacy of the
consideration”56 and complained that the Lake Front Act granted “valuable property, with
equally valuable privileges, for a merely nominal sum.”57 Echoing such concerns,
Governor Palmer initially vetoed the Act, declaring:
[T]he obligations of prudence and good faith require that the [north Lake
Park] property shall not be sold for less than its full market value . . . [I
am] assured by the highest authorities upon the subject of the value of real
estate in the city of Chicago, that the property . . . offered . . . for the sum
of eight hundred thousand dollars, has a market value of two million[], six
hundred thousand dollars.58
Further inflaming public opposition, the Act was subject to accusations of
corruption.59 Indeed, the Court obliquely referenced the dubious legislative process
48

Id. at 845.
See id. at 846–47.
50
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 449 (1892).
51
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 808.
52
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 451 (stating that “[t]he grant is accompanied with a proviso that the fee of
the lands shall be held by the company in perpetuity, and that it shall not have the power to grant, sell or
convey the fee thereof”).
53
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 921.
54
Id. at 854.
55
Id. at 861 (citing The Lake Park and Front Bills, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16, 1869, at 2).
56
Id. at 866.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 873.
59
Id. at 887–92.
49
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noting, “The circumstances attending the passage of the [A]ct through the legislature
were on the hearing the subject of much criticism.”60 The accusations, however
compelling, were never proven. On this question, Professors Kearny and Merrill
concluded that, “although the documentary record from 1869 cannot be said definitely to
establish that the Illinois Central used corrupt means to facilitate the enactment of the
Lake Front Act, it probably leans in that direction.”61 Nonetheless, owing to the
consideration provided by the railroad and the regulatory control retained by the state, it
is “abundantly clear that many if not most of those voting for the Lake Front Act
sincerely perceived it to be in the general interest.”62
B. Holding
In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court refused to recognize the legitimacy of the
Lake Front Act.63 First, the Court found that the state’s title to the Chicago Harbor was
not absolute; rather, the state held such special lands in public trust.64 Surveying state and
federal opinions, the Court divined the following common law rule: “[T]he bed or soil of
navigable waters is held by the people of the state in their character as sovereign in trust
for public uses for which they are adapted.”65 The Court distinguished public trust lands,
alternately described as “property of a special character”66 or “property in which the
whole people are interested,”67 from “public lands which are open to pre-emption and
sale.”68 Second, applying the Plat Act, the Court found the legislature lacked authority to
convey north Lake Park. “By a statute of Illinois,” the Court wrote, “the making,
acknowledging and recording of the plats operated to vest the title to the streets, alleys,
ways and commons, and other public grounds designated on such plats, in the city, in
trust for the public uses to which they were applicable.”69 Strictly construing this Act, the
Court concluded that the State lacked any title in north Lake Park to convey.
Under the holding of Illinois Central, public trust lands are not inherently
inalienable. Rather, such lands are alienable if the state retains management and control
over the conveyed property or conveying the property serves the public interest.
Specifically, the Court held:
The trust devolving upon the state for the public, and which can only be
discharged by the management and control of property in which the public
has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The
control of the state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as
to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein,
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Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 451 (1892).
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 893.
62
Id. at 882.
63
Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 462–64.
64
Id. at 454.
65
Id. at 457–58 (emphasis added).
66
Id. at 454.
67
Id. at 453.
68
Id. at 452.
69
Id. at 462.
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or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public
interest in the lands and waters remaining.70
An alternative rule, the Court concluded, “would place every harbor in the country at the
mercy of a majority of the legislature of the state in which the harbor is situated.”71 In the
Court’s judgment,
The legislation which may be needed one day for the harbor may be
different from the legislation that may be required at another day. . . [I]t is
vital to the public welfare that each [legislature] should be able at all times
to do whatever the varying circumstances and present exigencies attending
the subject may require; . . . a different result would be fraught with evil.72
Applying this rule, the Court found that the Act’s grant of submerged lands
violated the public trust because the conveyance impaired the public interest. The Court
described the Chicago Harbor as a “common highway[] for commerce, trade, and
intercourse”73 and recognized its “immense value to the people of the state of Illinois in
the facilities it affords to its vast and constantly increasing commerce.”74 The Act,
however, “put it in the power of the [railroad] company to delay indefinitely the
improvement of the harbor,”75 thus undermining the state’s ability to manage and control
commercially vital infrastructure in accordance with public necessity, safety, and welfare.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCESSION AGREEMENT
In December 2008, the Chicago City Council enacted, and Mayor Richard Daley
signed, a seventy-five-year contract conveying to Morgan Stanley the exclusive right to
all revenues derived from the city’s stock of approximately 34,000 on-street metered
parking spaces and 2000 city-owned garage spaces.76 In return, the city received an
upfront $1.15 billion payment.77 In enacting the agreement, the council bound the city to
a predetermined schedule of parking meter rates through 2084,78 obliging subsequent city
councils to compensate Morgan Stanley for deviations which materially impair investors’
expected profits.79 Similarly, the agreement obliges the city to compensate Morgan
Stanley for any action that reduces investors’ expected profits beyond specified
thresholds.80 Though the Agreement contains a “Reserved Powers” provision, ostensibly
70

Id. at 453.
Id. at 455.
72
Id. at 459–60.
73
Id. at 458–59.
74
Id. at 454.
75
Id. at 451.
76
See J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25.
77
Id. at 50508.
78
Id. at 50516–18.
79
See id. at 50549 (indicating that “Reserved Powers” includes the city’s power to “establish and revise
from time to time the schedule of Metered Parking Fees for the use of Metered Parking Spaces”); see also
id. at 50621 (requiring the city to compensate Morgan Stanley for exercising its “Reserved Powers”). See
generally infra Appendix, Use of Reserved Powers.
80
See infra Appendix, Compensation Event.
71
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reserving for the city the right to dictate parking meter prices and remove on-street
parking spaces, the agreement also contains a “Reserved Powers Adverse Action
Compensation” provision requiring compensation to Morgan Stanley for any exercise of
such powers.81 Indeed, according to the concessionaire’s 2010 financial statements, the
City of Chicago paid Morgan Stanley $533,330 in the first year of the lease for “changes
to the system . . . which reduce[d] the company’s revenue.”82
Aldermen voted on the highly technical, 125-page, seventy-year contract only two
days after Mayor Daley unveiled the proposal.83 The agreement was subject to only about
one hour of debate and passed by a vote of 40 to 5.84 Alderman Richard Mell admitted
that he and many of his colleagues did not thoroughly read the agreement: “How many of
us read the stuff we do get, OK? I try to. I try to. I try to. But being realistic, being
realistic, it's like getting your insurance policy. It's small print, OK?”85 As one of only
five aldermen to vote against the agreement, Leslie Hairston explained, "I don't really
know who we are dealing with. We need answers before we can vote on this."86
Compounding the inadequacies of the legislative process, the city council began
immediately appropriating Morgan Stanley’s payment, exhausting in approximately two
years the “$1.15 billion parking meter windfall that was supposed to last for 75 years.”87
Significantly, the city council expended these funds not on new capital improvements,
but merely to plug annual operating deficits.88 In the fall 2010, Fitch ratings agency
“downgraded Chicago's bond rating, in part because the city had used money from the
meter-lease to pay for operations.”89
The City of Chicago inspector general issued an analysis of the parking meter
privatization in June 2009. “Conservatively,” the report concluded, the city undersold the
system by $974 million, or approximately half its value.90 The inspector general
concluded that the city succumbed to “[t]he temptation of entering into [the agreement] in
order to receive [a] large, upfront payment[] that solve[d] short-term financial problems,
without properly considering the long-term implications of the deal.”91 Further, the
inspector general found that the deal was “rushed through the City’s legislative body,
81

See infra Appendix, Use of Reserved Powers.
Chicago Parking Meters, LLC, supra note 25, at 8.
83
See Mihalopoulos & Dardick, supra note 27.
84
Id.
85
Id.
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Id.
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Fran Spielman, $700 MILLION GAP | As City Faces Huge Budget Gap, Just $180 Mil. Left of $1.15 Bil.
Meter Windfall, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July. 21, 2010, http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/article/reservesdwindling-city-faces-700m-budget-gap; see also Fran Spielman, Daley's Final Budget Sails Through the
City Council, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/2456862-418/mayorbudget-million-daley-chicago.html [hereinafter Daley’s Final Budget]; Fran Spielman, $587 Million
Budget Deficit Awaits Rahm Emanuel, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 6, 2011,
http://www.suntimes.com/news/politics/5222836-418/budget-deficit-awaiting-emanuel-upwards-of-587million.html [hereinafter $587 Million Budget Deficit] (noting that Mayor Daley took “a political beating
for leasing the city's parking meters, downtown parking garages and Chicago Skyway and spending nearly
all of the money those transactions generated to avoid tax increases in his last two budgets”).
88
Daley’s Final Budget, supra note 87.
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The Big Sell: Other Cities Can Learn from the Outgoing Mayor’s Experiment with Privatisation,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 2010, www.economist.com/node/17043320.
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See Report of Inspector General, supra note 19, at 2.
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with little time to digest and analyze a complicated transaction, with limited information
provided, and with little opportunity for public input and reaction.”92
The parking meter privatization has been plagued by accusations of corruption.93
This suspicion is fomented in part by the inspector general’s report, indicating that the
city significantly underpriced the asset. Moreover, the beneficiary of the city’s
mismanagement is Morgan Stanley, for whom Mayor Daley’s nephew serves as a vice
president and the firm’s Cook County lobbyist.94 According to the Chicago Sun Times,
William Daley Jr. moved to New York two years ago for a job with
Morgan Stanley, an investment giant with an appetite for the city of
Chicago. Within a year, his employer signed a new deal with his uncle,
Mayor Daley. Morgan Stanley got a 99-year lease to operate the city's four
underground parking garages. City Hall got an upfront payment of $563
million—the highest offer made. Morgan Stanley hopes to strike two more
deals with Mayor Daley. It's among several bidders seeking long-term
leases to run Midway Airport and oversee 36,161 parking meters.95
Further contributing to the appearance of impropriety, if not corruption, Morgan Stanley
prevailed as the preferred vendor in an opaque, nonpublic process.96 Nonetheless,
evidence of corruption is merely circumstantial.
Incidentally, no obvious public recourse exists. Mayor Daley, the party primarily
responsible for the parking meter privatization, chose not to run for reelection, perhaps in
part because of its unpopularity.97 Moreover, the city cannot simply rescind the contract
by returning Morgan Stanley’s payment. First, the city has appropriated virtually the
entire payment.98 Second, the contract specifies damages in excess of funds received,
namely, “the fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest” as determined by an
independent appraiser.99 This value includes Morgan Stanley’s expected profit, which is
substantial.100 With no obvious recourse, the inspector general notes that the Agreement
92

Id.
See, e.g., John Kass, Potential Challenger Has Some Frightening Words for Daley, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 21,
2010, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-08-21/news/ct-met-kass-0822-20100821_1_parking-meterdeal-street-parking-rates-challenger.
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Tim Novak, William Daley Jr., New York Investor, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 1, 2008, at A19.
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Ben Joravsky & Mick Dumke, New Evidence Suggests Chicago Leased Out Its Parking Meters for a
Fraction of What They’re Worth, CHI. READER, May 21, 2009, www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/onebillion-dollars/Content?oid=1123046.
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Rick Pearson & Hal Dardick, Majority Say No To Daley, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2010,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-07-18/news/chi-100718daley-poll_1_frequent-daley-critic-recordseventh-term-half-of-chicago-voters (noting that “[d]issatisfaction abounds . . . over Daley's handling of the
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parking meter system lease”). Upon retiring, Mayor Daley accepted employment with the law firm retained
by Chicago to draft the Concession Agreement. Mick Dumke, Daley Joining Law Firm He Previously
Hired for City's Meter Deal and Other Privatization Work, CHI. READER, June 1, 2011,
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“give[s] a private company control over a major public asset for three generations . . .
[with] significant impact on the everyday lives of its citizens.”101
III. ILLINOIS CENTRAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONCESSION AGREEMENT
This Part analyzes the Concession Agreement under the holding of Illinois Central.
This analysis begins, in subpart III(A), by surveying the development of the public trust
doctrine, demonstrating its historical application to municipal streets and placing the
Court’s 1892 Illinois Central opinion in historical context. Subpart III(B) scrutinizes the
Court’s Illinois Central opinion for evidence of this history, and the Court’s application
of public trust principles to Chicago’s municipal streets. Subpart III(C) applies the rules
governing the disposition of public trust property, announced in Illinois Central, to the
Concession Agreement.
A. The Public Trust Doctrine and Its Historical Application to Public Streets
Today, the public trust doctrine generally, and Illinois Central specifically, is
presumed to apply to environmentally sensitive lakes, rivers and wetlands, not city streets
and alleys. Nonetheless, from its very inception, through at least the late nineteenth
century, the public trust doctrine served to protect not only commercially vital
waterways, but their upland equivalents, municipal streets and highways. This history
informs Illinois Central and, thus, an understanding of this history is essential to
understanding the Illinois Central opinion.
1. Ancient and Early English Conceptions of the Public Trust Doctrine
Discussions of the history of the public trust doctrine invariably begin with the
Roman Institutes of Justinian, composed in 528 A.D., which recognized a public right to
“perpetual use” of “certain common properties . . . such as the seashore, highways, and
running water.”102 The Code “designated public roads, harbors, rivers and riverbanks as
res publicae. These objects were considered to be the property of the Roman people
and . . . were held for the free use of all.”103 As res publicae properties, public roads were
Preston, A Windfall for Investors, a Loss for Chicago, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 12, 2010,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_34/b4192044579970.htm.
101
See Report of Inspector General, supra note 19, at 2.
102
Sax, supra note 4, at 475 (emphasis added). But see James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient
Truths—A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 1–2 (2007) (noting “a
history of pervasive private ownership in both Rome and England” of state-owned waters and lands); Sax,
supra note 4, at 475 (acknowledging the lack of a public right in Rome and England to enforce public trust
protections). For our purposes, however, the relevant question is not the practical effectiveness of these
ancient doctrines, but rather the degree to which they applied equally under the law to both navigable rivers
and upland highways.
103
SELVIN, supra note 3, at 17 (emphasis added). Thomas Sandars, in his definitive translation of the
Institutes of Justinian, explains the publicus thusly:
The word publicus is sometimes used as equivalent to communis [i.e., air and seas], but is
probably used, as here, for what belongs to the people. Things public belong to a
particular people, but may be used and enjoyed by all men . . . . The particular people or
nation in whose territory public things lie may permit all the world to make use of them,
but exercises a special jurisdiction to prevent any one injuring them . . . . [Such
properties] ‘are subject to the guardianship of the Roman people.’
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afforded special protection unavailable to agri vectigales, or public lands available for
lease, and similar state and municipal properties; such properties the state or municipality
“held exactly like individuals . . . the state or corporate being looked on as any other
owner.”104 Thus, the Institutes of Justinian, the ancient foundation of the public trust
doctrine, does not appear to discriminate, in its protection of res publicae property,
between submerged lands, such as harbors and rivers, and their commercial non-riparian
counterparts, public roads and highways.
Early English common law conceptions of the public trust “borrowed” from the
Institutes of Justinian.105 According to public trust scholar Professor Molly Selvin,
“Those public trust rights which did exist in the corpus of [early English] common law
doctrines . . . can be found in the two treatises [De Jure Maris and De Portibus Maris] of
Sir Matthew Hale,” Chief Justice of the King’s Bench from 1671 until 1675.106 In De
Jure Maris, Lord Hale described the rudimentary public trust doctrine of early English
common law, essentially a public easement which applied equally to upland highways
and navigable rivers. Lord Hale acknowledged that the soil beneath an upland highway or
a navigable river may, under the early English common law, “in point of property . . . be
a private man’s freehold.”107 Yet, the fee was subject to a “publick interest,” or right of
passage, which may not be “prejudiced or damnified.”108 This right of passage, Lord Hale
concluded, applied equally to upland highways and navigable rivers
whether fresh or salt, that are a common passage, not only for ships and
greater vessels, but also for smaller, as barges or boats; . . . for as the
common highways on the land are for the common land passage, so these
kind of rivers, whether fresh or salt, that bear boats or barges, are
highways by water; and as the highways by land are called [a royal high
road] so these publick rivers for publick passage are called [a royal road
by water] . . . ; all things of publick safety and convenience being in a
special manner under the king’s care, supervision, and protection.109
Interpreting De Jure Maris, Professor Selvin asserts, “As protector of the highways,
public rivers, and seaports, [only] the king could order the removal of all nuisances or
obstructions to the common passage in such properties . . . . Royal ownership and
regulatory responsibilities, then, placed these important resources in a form of public
THOMAS COLLETT SANDARS, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN WITH ENGLISH INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION
AND NOTES 91 (7th ed. 1910).
104
THOMAS COLLETT SANDARS, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN WITH ENGLISH INTRODUCTION,
TRANSLATION AND NOTES 160 (Chi., Callaghan & Co., 1st Am. ed. 1876),

http://www.archive.org/stream/institutesjusti00hammgoog#page/n226/mode/2up.
See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 11, at 308 (“Bracton, writing in the mid-thirteenth century, borrowed
from Justinian’s Institutes and claimed that at common law the sea and seashore were common to all.”).
106
SELVIN, supra note 3, at 24; see also MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 11, at 309 (stating that “it was
Hale’s version of English law that served as the starting point for American writers, most notably Joseph
Angell and James Kent, who presented a vision of English water law as a baseline for introducing the
American law on the subject”).
107
STUART MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 405 (3d ed. 1888)
(reciting DE JURE MARIS).
108
Id. at 405.
109
Id. at 374.
105
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trust.”110 Thus, the early English common law, as articulated by Lord Hale, mirrored the
Institutes of Justinian in subjecting not only navigable submerged lands but their upland
equivalents, the “common highways,” to a form of public trust protection.
2. Early-Nineteenth Century American Law
Beginning in the 1840s, half a century before Illinois Central, “state and federal
courts began to formulate a large body of public trust law.”111 During this period, “Courts
of the Middle Atlantic [and New England regions which included the country’s largest
metropolises: New York, Baltimore, Boston, and Philadelphia]112 ruled that the streets of
their major cities ‘are species of property’ held in trust for the public.”113 The impetus for
this aggressive assertion of public rights was industrialization; namely, “[a]s railroad and
shipping improved during the century, control of harbor-front property in particular and
urban property in general came to mean control of the economic destiny of a particular
locality.”114 Foreshadowing Illinois Central, “[t]he overwhelming majority of trust
litigation during the mid-nineteenth century in these states centered around the rights of
railroads in public streets and tidal property.”115
Unlike in England, where the soil beneath public streets and navigable streams
remained “in point of property . . . a private man’s freehold,” early nineteenth century
states began vesting the title to soil beneath navigable waterways and upland highways in
public entities, not private landowners.116 In Illinois, for instance, the legislature enacted
the “Plat Act,” vesting municipal streets, alleys, and ways “in the corporate name thereof
in trust . . . .”117 While affirming public ownership of soils beneath tidal lands and city
110

SELVIN, supra note 3, at 25–26.
Id. at 63.
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See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION OF THE 90 URBAN PLACES: 1830,
www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab06.txt.
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SELVIN, supra note 3, at 108.
114
Id. at 102.
115
Id. at 106.
116
Id. at 107–21.
117
Plat Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/3 (West 2010) (emphasis added). The Act remains virtually
identical to the Act as amended in 1845. Today, the Act reads, “[T]he premises intended for any street,
alley, way, common or other public use in any city, village or town, or addition thereto, shall be held in the
corporate name thereof in trust to and for the uses and purposes set forth or intended.” Id. In 1845, the Act
read, “And the land intended to be for streets, alleys, ways, common or other public uses, in any town or
city, or addition thereto, shall be held in the corporate name thereof, in trust to, and for the uses and
purposes set forth and expressed or intended.” Plat Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 25 (1845), available at
http://www.archive.org/stream/revisedstatuteso00illi#page/n11/mode/2up.
During the early and mid-nineteenth century, the Illinois Supreme Court consistently affirmed the
public trust obligation the Plat Act imposed on municipalities. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Haven, 11 Ill. 554
(1850) (“A proprietor of land, who lays out the same, under our statute, into town or city lots, vests the
legal title to the land embraced by streets, in the corporation of the town or city, for the use and benefit of
the public. It is a solemn dedication of the ground to the [municipal] corporation, to be held in trust for the
uses and purposes of the public.”) (emphasis added); City v. Ill. Transp. Co., 12 Ill. 37, 59 (1850)
("Whatever title to these public grounds may be vested in the city, she has not the unqualified control and
disposition of them. They were dedicated to the public for particular purposes, and only for such purposes
can they be rightfully used. For these purposes the city may improve and control them, and adopt all
needful rules and regulations for their management and use, but she can not alien[ate] or otherwise dispose
of them. At most, she but holds them in trust for the benefit of the public . . . . This is not like the case of
property purchased by the city for her own exclusive use, which she could dispose of at her pleasure.”); see
111
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streets, mid-nineteenth century courts sanctioned the right of the state, as sovereign, to
appropriate such properties as consistent with the states’ trust obligations. Indeed, during
this period, states’ rights to dispose of public trust property, including tidal property118
and public streets,119 were “almost unqualifiable,” “inalienable,” “absolute” and
“despotic.”120 The supreme court of Pennsylvania, for instance, claimed the fee to the soil
beneath all state highways, including every “navigable stream, which is a public
highway,” but declared that this enviable inventory of trust resources were ‘subject to
[the State’s] absolute discretion and control’. . . over which she holds despotic sway, the
remedy for an abuse of [this power] being a change of rulers and a consequent change of
the law.”121 In this manner, the early nineteenth century courts validated
extraordinary legislative grants of privilege to semi-public corporations,
most specifically the railroad and turnpike companies. Those privileges
stemmed from the basic judicial determination that the operation of
railroad and turnpikes on city streets, piers, and public highways was
consistent with the public trust under which the state legislatures and
municipal corporations held those properties.122
Nonetheless, courts occasionally invalidated such privileges when conveyed by
municipalities, which lacked a state’s “despotic” sovereign power. In Milhau v. Sharp,
for instance, the plaintiffs challenged a grant by New York City for the construction and
operation of a private passenger railway on Broadway Avenue.123 The New York
supreme court, in an opinion upheld by the New York Court of Appeals,124 concluded
also City of Quincy v. Jones, 76 Ill. 231 (1875). Nonetheless, mid-nineteenth century Illinois jurists, like
their New England and Mid-Atlantic contemporaries, embraced the economic potential of the iron horse
and thus found the appropriation of public streets for railroad purposes consistent with public trust
principles. See Stack v. E. St. Louis, 85 Ill. 377, 379–80 (1877).
118
In In re N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 77 N.Y. 248 (1879), a factual dispute similar to Illinois
Central, the New York Court of Appeals upheld a state grant of submerged lands beneath New York
Harbor to a railroad corporation. Admitting the land beneath New York Harbor “is held in trust, [and] . . .
cannot be appropriated for any purposes inconsistent with such use and rights of the public in the waters,”
the court nonetheless concluded, “such rights are [not] invaded by an appropriation for the purposes now
claimed.” Id. at 259.
119
Courts during this period overwhelmingly sanctioned the use of railroads on city streets as consistent
with the public trust in which such property was held. In the most prominent Supreme Court opinion on this
question during the mid-nineteenth century, Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876), the Supreme
Court acknowledged, “public authorities ought to have entire control of the great passageways of
commerce and navigation, to be exercised for the public advantage and convenience.” Id. at 338.
Nonetheless, the Court concluded a state grant to several railroad corporations to operate on the streets of
Keokuk, Iowa, which necessitated partially filling the Mississippi River, did not violate this principle.
“Though attended with some inconveniences,” the Court admitted, “[railroads] have greatly added to the
efficiency of the public thoroughfares, and have more than doubled their capacity for travel and
transportation.” Id. at 341. Significantly, however, the Court mandated the removal of a freight depot,
constructed “under the contract with the city,” id. at 329, because the structure “was a total obstruction of
the passage,” and was thus “subversive of, and totally repugnant to, the dedication of the street, as well as
to the rights of the public.” Id. at 342.
120
See SELVIN, supra note 3, at 116–17.
121
Phila. & Trenton R.R. Co., 6 Whart. 25 (Pa. 1840).
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SELVIN, supra note 3, at 12.
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Milhau v. Sharp, 15 Barb. 193 (N.Y. 1853).
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Davis v. Mayor of N.Y., 14 N.Y. 506, 522 (1856).
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that the city exceeded its authority by conveying public trust property to a private
corporation for nominal consideration, specifically, “a trifling sum, with the right to
demand five cents fare from travelers, when the trustees might have obtained a million of
[sic] dollars for the grant, with a charge upon travelers of only three cents.”125 The court
wrote:
[The city council] is the depositary of a trust which it is bound to
administer faithfully, honestly and justly. And no one will content that the
body of men, who for the time being, may be its duly authorized
representatives, can legally dispose of its property of great value, without
any or for a nominal consideration; and if they shall presume to do so, it
will be no excuse for such a gross and unwarrantable breach of trust to say
that they acted in their legislative capacity; for the very simple reason that
they will not act in that capacity.126
The concession at issue in Milhau was the right to lay track on Broadway Avenue.
The city argued that the license represented merely “permission” to use the street, without
granting an exclusive right of possession.127 The court questioned this distinction, but
ultimately dismissed the relevance of the “character” of the grant:
[I]t is immaterial what particular name is given to this thing which is thus
granted. Whether it be a thing corporeal or incorporeal, or whatever be its
correct legal designation, it is a species of property of some kind. It is a
property held by the city, and is subject to the same trusts and duties as its
other [trust] property.128
Similarly, in Quincy v. Jones the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that a city may not
grant a non-possessory right “to the lateral support of the soil in [a] street.”129 Invoking
the Plat Act, the court reasoned:
It is the unquestioned duty of the city, in controlling and improving the
streets, to prepare them for public use, as streets, at such time and in such
manner as the public necessities may require. Holding them in trust for the
public, and having no authority to convey or divert them to other uses, it
125

Milhau, 15 Barb. at 198 (summarizing the argument of the plaintiff, with whom the court ultimately
sided).
126
Id. at 212. Foreshadowing Illinois Central, in which the Court reasoned, “The position advanced by the
railroad company . . . would place every harbor in the country at the mercy of a majority of the legislature
of the State in which the harbor is situated,” 146 U.S. at 455, the New York supreme court, half a century
earlier, warned, “If a different doctrine were established, the mayor and aldermen of the city of New-York
might, at the next meeting of the common council, distribute the whole of the property owned by the city
among themselves, provided that they adhered to the ordinary forms of legislation.” Milhau, 15 Barb. at
213.
127
Milhau, 15 Barb. at 202, 206. In support of this position, the city argued, “Every precaution was taken to
prevent the rails from being felt by any vehicle passing in the street. . . . [T]he safety, health, comfort and
convenience of the public were carefully attended to . . . Nor would the cars interfere with the ordinary use
of the street for other vehicles.” Id. at 202.
128
Id. at 214.
129
76 Ill. 231, 244 (1875).
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would seem inevitably to follow that they can have no power to grant to
individuals rights or easements in the street which might in any way
interfere with the duty of preparing them for public use to meet the public
necessities; for it is obvious that if such rights may be granted, then the
practical use of the streets may become so burdened with private rights as
to place it beyond the pecuniary ability of the city to discharge its duty to
the public, with reference to them.130
3. Late Nineteenth-Century American Law
By the late nineteenth century, courts began to question states’ “proclivity toward
the privatization of trust resources,”131 a sentiment “coincident with the prevailing
popular hostilities toward railroad corporations.”132 As A Treatise on the Law of Roads
and Streets—published in 1890, two years prior to Court’s Illinois Central opinion—
lamented:
It is, in truth, somewhat difficult to vindicate the doctrine that private
corporations may use the streets of a city for their own benefit . . . . It is
true, as history proves, that municipalities are quick to grant important
privileges without restriction which they subsequently feel the necessity of
limiting, but not until after it is too late, and it is undeniably true that
courts have not been entirely free from the same general influence which
moved the local bodies.133
In the late nineteenth century, state supreme courts, and the United States Supreme
Court, began to invalidate legislative appropriations of public trust property. Prior to the
Supreme Court’s Illinois Central opinion, state supreme courts in New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana invoked public trust principles to rescind legislative
grants for the construction and operation of elevated, for-profit railroads on public
streets.134 For instance, in New York’s so-called Elevated Rail Cases, consisting of Story
v. N.Y. Elevated R.R. Co. and Lahr v. Metro. Elevated Ry. Co., the plaintiffs challenged
the legislature’s authority to grant a private corporation the right to construct and operate
an “El,” or elevated railroad, on the streets of New York.135 The New York Court of
Appeals, in language foreshadowing the Supreme Court’s Illinois Central opinion,136
found “[t]he legislature . . . had no power to authorize the street to be used for an elevated
steam railroad.”137 While acknowledging “travel on the surface of the street would . . .
130

Id. at 242–43.
See SELVIN, supra note 3, at 147.
132
Id. at 303.
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BYRON K. ELLIOTT & WILLIAM F. ELLIOTT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ROADS AND STREETS 559–60
(1890).
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See, e.g., Story v. N.Y. Elevated R.R. Co. 90 N.Y. 122 (1882); Lahr v. Metro. Elevated Ry. Co., 104
N.Y. 268 (1887); Pa. R.R. Co. v. Miller, 132 U.S. 75, 82 (1889); Jones v. Erie & Wyo. Valley R.R. Co.,
151 Pa. 30 (1892); Griffin v. Shreveport & Ark. R.R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 808 (La. 1889); Costigan v. Pa. R.R.
Co., 54 N.J.L. 233 (N.J. 1892). See generally SELVIN, supra note 3, at 305–13.
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See Story, 90 N.Y. at 122; Lahr, 104 N.Y. at 268.
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See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (“A grant of all the lands under the
navigable waters of a state has never been adjudged to be within the legislative power.”) (emphasis added).
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See Lahr, 104 N.Y. at 296.
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still be possible,”138 the grant authorized the “permanent appropriation of the street for
railroad purposes, . . . a perversion of its use.”139
Pursuant to the Act of 1813, comparable to the Illinois Plat Act, New York
municipalities hold title to city streets “in trust.”140 The court construed the trust as a
“contract written in the statute.”141 Thus, the legislature could not reappropriate public
streets by the mere exercise of legislative discretion.142 The United States Supreme Court
“explicitly affirmed”143 this principle.144 Applying New York law, the Court found:
The logical effect of [the Elevated Rail Cases] is to construe the
Constitution as to operate as a restriction upon the legislative power over
the public streets . . . and confine its exercise to such legislation as shall
authorize their use for street purposes alone. The trust upon which streets
are held is that they shall be devoted to the uses of public travel. When
they, or a substantial part of them, are turned over to the exclusive use of a
single person or corporation, we see no reason why a state court may not
hold that it is a perversion of their legitimate uses, [and] a violation of the
trust . . . .145
The consequences of the Elevated Railroad decisions were immense. In the wake
of the Story decision, the New York City “El” system, operational for approximately
three years, effectively ceased to function,146 generating an enormous capital loss for its
private investors. Moreover, the Story and Lahr decisions reverberated throughout late
nineteenth-century courts. The supreme courts of Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and New
Jersey subsequently imposed similar restrictions on the operation of elevated railroads.147
In addition, the success of plaintiffs in challenging elevated railroads as a violation of the
public trust motivated certain courts to reconsider their earlier enthusiasm for
accommodating surface railroads on public streets.148
As a consequence of such decisions, by the 1890s, public streets, like state and
municipal harbors, were deemed public trust property and accorded protection under the
public trust doctrine. In 1897, the American & English Encyclopedia of Law announced,
as a general principle of law not specific to any particular state, “Municipal corporations
hold the title to streets, alleys, public squares, wharves, etc., in trust for the public; and
upon principle, such trust property can no more be disposed of by the corporation than
138
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courts, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to distinguish between surface and elevated lines, and thus found
the latter consistent with Chicago’s public trust obligations. See Summerfield v. Chicago, 197 Ill. 270, 282
(1902). Critically, however, the court concluded the city council’s “object was not to grant the railroad
company additional privileges in the streets, but to secure the[ir] elevation . . . in the interest of the safety
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can any other trust property held by an individual.”149 Even in the absence of a specific
statute qualifying the rights of state and municipal authorities, as in New York and
Illinois, common law served to restrain their discretion by directly “vest[ing] the title in
trust for the public.”150
B. Evidence of this History in Illinois Central
Within the context of this extensive case and statutory history, the Illinois Central
Court composed its opinion. The question thus arises: does the opinion evidence this
history? An analysis of the opinion suggests the Court contemplated application of the
public trust doctrine beyond submerged lands to “streets, alleys [and] ways” in Illinois.
To begin, commentators have attempted, generally unsuccessfully, to apply the
holding of Illinois Central beyond submerged lands to upland natural resources, such as
forests. Revealingly, the Court itself specifically rejects this interpretation,
[Title to lands beneath navigable waters] is a title different in character
from that which the State holds in lands intended for sale. It is different
from the title which the United States hold in the public lands which are
open to preemption and sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of the
State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce
149

See Municipal Corporations, in 1 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 949, 1064 (John
Houston Merrill ed., 1891).
150
See ELLIOTT & ELLIOTT, supra note 133, at 91. This discussion is intended to place the Illinois Central
opinion in historical context, and thus terminates in the late nineteenth century. In the twentieth century,
courts expanded the public trust doctrine to encompass environmentally sensitive resources, while
generally ignoring, without specifically rejecting, its application to public streets. For instance, in the most
significant Supreme Court public trust decision of the latter half of the twentieth century, the Court
expanded the doctrine to encompass all lands under waters “subject to the ebb and flow of the tide,”
regardless of whether such waters are navigable. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469, 472 (1988).
Phillips, thus, significantly expanded the doctrine, without rejecting its earlier applications. It is worth
noting that the Supreme Court, in so-called “public forum doctrine” decisions, continues to state that public
streets are held in public trust. See Hauge v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“[w]herever
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public”);
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (noting that “all public streets are held in the public trust”);
Int’l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (noting that “all public streets are held in
the public trust”). See generally Karl P. Baker & Dwight H. Merriam, Indelible Public Interests in
Property: The Public Trust and the Public Forum, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 275 (2005) (“While these
doctrines stand on distinct historical and theoretical foundations and diverge from each other in many
respects, there are important parallels between them in how they conceptualize the relationship between
government’s power to regulate, control, and dispose of land it owns, and the rights belonging to what one
scholar has called the ‘unorganized public’ in that same property.”). As will be discussed in Part IV, Illinois
continues to apply public trust principles to non-submerged municipal property, including public streets
and parks. See, e.g., id. at 286 (“Illinois is one of the few states to have judicially expanded the public trust
doctrine to public parks.”). Unlike Illinois, the Iowa Supreme Court has specifically rejected the application
of the public trust doctrine to public streets. See Fencl v. City of Harpers Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808, 814 (Iowa
2000) (“We think these underpinnings of the public trust doctrine have no applicability to public streets and
alleys. Simply stated, an alley is not a natural resource.”). In specifically rejecting application of the
doctrine to public streets, Iowa is an exception. Moreover, unlike Illinois’s code, Iowa’s code does not
contain a Plat Act vesting title to municipal streets in public trust. Iowa Code § 354.19 (2011), titled
“Dedication of Land,” merely provides for “public access” to streets, whereas Illinois’s code requires that
title to soil beneath municipal streets be placed in public trust.
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over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties.151
While Illinois Central is self-evidently not applicable to upland natural resources, it is
equally self-evident the Court contemplated application of its holding beyond submerged
lands.
First, the Court referred to public trust property broadly, not narrowly in reference
only to submerged lands. The Court wrote, for instance, “The State can no more abdicate
its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and
soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private
parties . . .”152 Similarly, the Court wrote, “So with trusts connected with public property,
or property of a special character, like lands under navigable water, they cannot be
placed entirely beyond the direction and control of the State.”153 Such passages suggest
the Court perceived the soil beneath navigable waters as but one example of “property of
a special character” or “trust property in which the whole people are interested.”154 While
Justice Field refused to catalog all public trust property, an exercise unnecessary for the
disposition of the case, such language suggests the Court intended, or at least
contemplated, application of its rule to “public [trust] property” of which submerged land
was but one, common-law example.155
In fact, the Court specifically cited the Illinois Plat Act as an example of nonsubmerged public trust property. “By a statute of Illinois,” the Court wrote, “the making,
acknowledging and recording of the plats operated to vest the title to the streets, alleys,
ways and commons, and other public grounds designated on such plats, in the city [of
Chicago], in trust for the public uses to which they were applicable.”156 This discussion is
remarkable for two related reasons. First, the Court explicitly acknowledged the existence
of non-submerged public trust property, namely “streets, alleys [and] ways” in Illinois.
Second, the statutory command contained in the Plat Act, and recited by the Court, is
virtually identical to the Court’s description of the common-law public trust in
submerged lands. Whereas the Court ruled that submerged land is held, under the
common law, “in trust . . . for the public uses, for which it is adapted,”157 the Plat Act
states that streets, alleys and ways are held “in trust for the public uses to which they
were applicable.”158 Presumably, the Court consciously employed this parallel
construction between the statute and the common-law right, suggesting the two public
trusts, as conceived by the Court, were essentially equivalent.159
151
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extend to wharves, harbors or other submerged property. See Plat Act, 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 205/3 (West
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Second, Illinois Central’s references to navigable waters as “natural highways”160
and “common highways for commerce, trade and intercourse”161 further suggests the
Court believed public trust principles applied to non-submerged highways. Indeed, the
Court explicitly relied on Lord Hale’s conception of the public trust, one conceived, as
earlier discussed, on the analogy between navigable waters and upland highways, and on
the assumption, under early English law, all such properties were subject to the King’s
protection.162 The Court wrote:
In his treatise on De Jure Maris, Lord Hale says: The jus privatum that is
acquired by the subject, either by patent or prescription, must not
prejudice the jus publicum, wherewith public rivers and the arms of the
seas are affected to public use; . . . The principle of the common law to
which we have adverted is founded upon the most obvious principles of
public policy. The sea and navigable rivers are natural highways, and
injury to them is injury to commerce . . . .163
Thus, “the most obvious principles of public policy” dictated that the trust
encompass not only aquatic, but upland, highways. This was precisely the effect of the
Plat Act, for “[t]he word ‘highway,’” according to Angell and Durfee’s 1886 A Treatise
on the Highways, “is considered as the genus of all public ways; So that a common street
in any city or town, being common to all people, is a public highway.”164
Finally, an earlier Supreme Court opinion suggests that Justice Field believed the
public trust doctrine extended beyond submerged lands.165 In Townsend v. Greeley,
authored by Justice Field, the Court held that certain non-submerged, non-tidal lands,
formerly under Mexican authority, were subject to public trust protection; the Court thus
imposed restrictions on their alienability. Paraphrasing Field’s opinion, Professor Selvin
writes,
“It is therefore now the settled law,” he wrote, that the land thus held by
pueblos’ towns under the Mexican government were not held by the them
in absolute property but in trust for the benefit of their inhabitants and
were held subject to a similar trust by municipal bodies which have
succeed to the possession of such property.166
In conclusion, while the Illinois Central holding is not applicable to upland natural
resources, the rules announced by the Court apply broadly to public trust property, not
merely to navigable submerged land. While the Court was unwilling to inventory all such
property, Justice Field’s opinion identified the Plat Act, and thus “streets, alleys [and]
ways” in Illinois, as an example of non-submerged public trust land. Justice Field
160
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specifically cited the Act, consciously copied the Act, and implicitly endorsed the Act by
invoking “the most obvious principles of public policy.”
C. Application of Illinois Central’s Holding to the Concession Agreement
Assuming Justice Field intended, or at least anticipated, application of the Court’s
holding beyond submerged lands to “streets, alleys, [and] ways” in Illinois, the question
arises whether a temporary, non-possessory, lease—which does not impede the public’s
right of passage—violates the rules announced by the Court. As discussed in subpart
I(B), the Court prohibited a state from “placi[ng]” public trust property “beyond the
direction and control of the State,” unless the conveyance served the public interest.167
Applying this rule, the Court found that “[t]he harbor of Chicago is of immense value to
the people of the State of Illinois in the facilities is affords to its vast and constantly
increasing commerce.”168 The Court thus rejected the idea that “placing [it] in the hands
of a private corporation created for a different purpose” served the public interest.169
Interpreting this rule, Professors Merrill and Kearny argue, “What [Justice Field] opposed
was what he imagined to be the conferral of a monopoly over the Chicago harbor on a
private corporation,” allowing it to engage in “rent-seeking” behavior and “delay
indefinitely the development of the harbor.”170
On the surface, conveying a non-possessory lease of on-street parking meter
infrastructure may not appear to implicate such concerns. Ensuring on-street parking,
unlike promoting economic development, is not an essential governmental obligation.
Indeed, private parking lots dot Chicago; such lots undoubtedly promote, not impair,
commerce. Upon inspection, however, the Concession Agreement mirrors the Lake Front
Act in encouraging the stagnation of publicly owned infrastructure essential to Chicago’s
economic and urban development, precisely the concerns invoked by Justice Field.
Specifically, the Concession Agreement effectively eliminates the city’s ability to
substantially redesign, redevelop, or reallocate on-street parking for three generations
because “any [such] action at any time” triggers an Adverse Action Concession
Compensation Payment equal to Morgan Stanley’s expected, unrealized, and substantial
profit.171 A seventy-five-year commitment to maintaining 36,000 on-street public parking
spaces represents a significant impairment of the city’s ability to develop as future
generations and technological advances demand—to add bus-only or bicycle lanes, build
streetcars, expand the “El” system, extend sidewalks, improve landscaping, or create
pedestrian markets or thoroughfares by closing streets to traffic. Morgan Stanley’s
position is thus, quintessentially, one of a rent-seeker. The company is specifically
prohibited by the Concession Agreement from improving the public rights-of-way, other
than installing systems to facilitate the collection of revenues. Yet, the city cannot
improve the public rights-of-way or, as Justice Field writes, “do whatever the varying
circumstances and present exigencies attending the subject may require,” without
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compensating Morgan Stanley.172 The Agreement thus allows a for-profit corporation,
one “created for a different purpose” and obligated to maximize shareholder returns, the
right to “delay indefinitely the improvement” of publicly owned infrastructure essential
to the general welfare, a result in Justice Field’s judgment “fraught with evil.”173
As one example of the redevelopment of municipal rights-of-way, New York City
recently installed over 200 miles of bicycle lanes on city streets “much of them created
by eliminating parking.”174 And a little over a year ago the city closed Broadway to
vehicle traffic in Times Square and Herald Square, transforming New York's two busiest
shopping and entertainment plazas into pedestrian malls.175 Critically, the benefits of
such transportation reforms are not merely aesthetic. As a consequence of New York’s
reforms, “Pedestrian fatalities from collisions with cars are down 19 percent from 2001.
Bicycle fatalities are down 54 percent, despite a tripling of the number of bikes on the
road since that year.”176 In fact, in the past two years, “Fewer people have been killed in
traffic accidents on New York’s streets than at any time in the past century, according to
city records.”177 New York, of course, is not alone. Seattle is eliminating on-street
parking spaces to extend its streetcar network.178 Oakland is proposing to eliminate onstreet parking to create a rapid bus transit system.179 The Concession Agreement
represents a significant, if not insurmountable, impediment to such redevelopment of
Chicago’s public rights-of-way, “substantial[ly] impair[ing]” the public interest.
The city may argue, reasonably, that the Concession Agreement is distinguishable
from the Lake Front Act. Foremost, the city retains title to the property, whereas the Lake
Front Act conveyed title in fee simple. Upon inspection, however, this distinction proves
irrelevant. In determining whether the Lake Front Act relinquished “management and
practical[] control” of a public trust asset, the Court dismissed the mere legal form of a
conveyance as immaterial and specifically rejected the distinction between a long-term
lease and a conveyance in fee.180 As discussed in subpart I(A), in enacting the Lake Front
Act the legislature sought to protect the public interest by prohibiting the railroad from
conveying its ownership in the harbor. Dismissing the significance of this supposed
prohibition, Justice Field wrote, “The inhibition against the technical transfer of the fee of
172
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any portion of the submerged lands was of little consequence when it could make a lease
for any period and renew it at its pleasure.”181 Applying Field’s reasoning, any
prohibition on the alienation of public trust property is “of little consequence” when a
state may subvert it by “mak[ing] a lease for any period and renew[ing] it at its pleasure.”
Additionally, the city may argue Morgan Stanley lacks an exclusive right of
possession, and is specifically prohibited from obstructing the public rights-of-way.182
Again, under the Court’s Illinois Central analysis, merely ensuring unimpeded public
passage is not sufficient to validate a conveyance of public trust property. Justice Field
acknowledged, for instance, that “[the railroad’s] works in no respect interfered with any
useful freedom in the use of the waters of the lake for commerce, foreign, interstate or
domestic.”183 Likewise, the dissent noted that “[t]he Lake Front Act had prohibited the
railroad from interfering with the public right of navigation and had preserved the power
of the State to regulate the railroad’s construction of improvements in the harbor.”184
Thus, Justice Field is not concerned merely with physically obstructing the channels of
commerce. Rather, his concern is the more subtle, and profound, impact of allowing
grants of private privilege in vital public infrastructure to retard the city’s continued
economic development. Thus, under Illinois Central, the differences in mere form
between the two conveyances are insufficient to render the Concession Agreement a valid
exercise of legislative authority.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE CONCESSION AGREEMENT
LITIGATION
Part III sought to demonstrate the Illinois Central Court considered “streets, alleys,
[and] ways” in Illinois as statutorily defined public trust property, subject to the
prohibitions governing the conveyance of navigable submerged lands. The question
arises, however, whether this interpretation of a century-old opinion is remotely relevant
in any meaningful, practical way. To this end, Part IV applies a public trust analysis to
the Concession Agreement, utilizing operative Illinois Supreme Court precedent. This
analysis introduces a theory, and accompanying case law, unexplored by the parties and
court in the current litigation.185
181
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To begin, the public trust doctrine self-evidently governs the Concession
Agreement. Specifically, Section 3.19 of the Concession Agreement reads,
The City agrees, and the Concessionaire acknowledges and accepts, that
the City holds and administers the public way in trust under the public
trust doctrine . . . . In the administration of its public trust with respect to
the public way, the City will not take any action in contradiction of the
public trust doctrine . . . .186
Should the City attempt to argue this contractual provision is superseded or otherwise
inoperative, the Agreement further states, “To the extent that any ordinance, resolution,
rule, order, or provision of the Municipal Code, or part thereof, is in conflict with the
provisions of this ordinance, the provisions of this ordinance shall be controlling.”187
This contractual provision is consistent with the state Plat Act, discussed in Illinois
Central. The Plat Act remains substantively identical to the Act as amended in 1845188
and currently reads, “[T]he premises intended for any street, alley, way, common or other
public use in any city, village or town, or addition thereto, shall be held in the corporate
name thereof in trust to and for the uses and purposes set forth or intended.”189
In subpart II(A), the Note introduced Quincy v. Jones, a mid-nineteenth-century
Plat Act decision prohibiting a municipality from burdening a public street with private
rights to the detriment of the public.190 Throughout the twentieth century, however, the
Illinois Supreme Court continued to strictly construe the Plat Act. For instance, in 1923,
in Chicago v. Chicago Century Railroad Company, the court refused to recognize the
validity of a contractual provision entitling a railroad to compensation when a
municipality demanded the company relocate its tracks.191 An alternative rule, the court
concluded, “might forever prevent improvements and development in particular streets
and would thereby determine [the municipality’s] growth.” Requiring compensation
would “seriously interfere[]” with the “duty of the city to protect the public in its use of
the streets, and from time to time, as the community develops, to keep the streets in such
condition as will accommodate public safety and convenience.”192
The court affirmed this position in 1953 in Peoples Gas Light & Coke Company v.
Chicago. In a similar factual dispute, the court refused to require the City of Chicago to
Although the First Amended Complaint contains certain general allegations challenging
the Concession Agreement, Plaintiffs explain in their Response and further elaborated
during this Hearing that the, quote, main issue here is whether the City’s expenditure of
public funds to pay police to issue parking tickets against and boot vehicles that belong to
people who have unpaid private debts owed to a private company [sic], close quote.
Report of the Proceedings at 62, Indep. Voters of Ill. v. Lux, 09-CH-28993 (Cook Cnty. Ct. filed Aug. 19,
2009).
186
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Agreement, while recognizing the relevance of the public trust doctrine, seem to assume merely ensuring
public passage satisfies the city’s trust obligations. As discussed in Part II and further explored in Part IV
this assumption is contradicted by precedent.
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Chicago v. Chi. Cent. Ry. Co., 324 Ill. 618, 623 (1926).
192
Id. at 623.
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compensate a utility for the cost of relocating its sub-street infrastructure, rejecting the
utility’s claim of a contractual right to payment.193 The court reasoned,
If the city could not change the grade or the width of its street except upon
condition that it make compensation to the railway company, the gas
company, the water company, the telephone company, the electric light
company and other companies occupying the streets under a contract with
the city, for inconvenience and expense thereby occasioned, the duty of
the city to protect the public in its use of the streets, and from time to time,
as the community develops, to keep the streets in such condition as will
accommodate the public safety and convenience, would be seriously
interfered with. All corporations thus occupying the streets take their
grants from the city upon condition that the city has reserved to it the full
and unconditional power to make any reasonable change of grade or other
improvement in its streets as the public necessity and convenience
demand.194
In a 1993 opinion, Arlington Heights v. AT&T, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
the public trust principles underlying Peoples Gas.195 In rejecting the efforts of two
home-rule municipalities to profit by “rent[ing]” or “leas[ing]” land beneath city streets
to a telecommunications provider, at prices in excess of the municipalities’ “actual costs,”
the majority held:
Municipalities do not possess proprietary powers over the public
streets. They only possess regulatory powers. The public streets are held in
trust for the use of the public. While numerous powers and rights
regarding public streets have been granted to municipalities by the General
Assembly, they are all regulatory in character, and do not grant any
authority to rent or to lease parts, or all, of a public street.
....
. . . The streets exist for the benefit of the entire public and are
subject only to reasonable regulations regarding usage. Streets do not exist
and were not created as either obstructions or revenue-producing property
for municipalities.196

193

Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Chi., 413 Ill. 457 (1953).
Id. at 465.
195
AT&T Co. v. Arlington Heights, 156 Ill. 2d 399, 409 (Ill. 1993) (emphasis added); id. at 414 (emphasis
added).
196
Id. at 409 (emphasis added). Though the rule announced in Arlington Heights is directly on-point, the
facts underlying the decision are not. In Arlington Heights, numerous municipalities threatened to charge
AT&T potentially inflated prices for laying cable beneath their streets, rendering such infrastructure
improvements prohibitively expensive. Thus, Arlington Heights invoked statewide, and not merely intracity, concerns. It is worth noting, however, that the supreme court in Peoples Gas stated:
[A municipality] holds [its streets] in trust for the people of the entire State. So far as
their use for street purposes is concerned, every citizen of the State has an equal right.
This right of the people in the streets and highways of the state, whether inside or outside
194
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Arlington Height’s prohibition on the exercise of “proprietary power” is
particularly revealing because the Illinois Central Court invoked precisely this language.
Specifically, Justice Field concluded, “The bed of Lake Michigan . . . [is] not held by the
State in any proprietary or private right”; rather, the character of the trust is
“governmental.”197 This suggests Arlington Heights incorporated public trust principles
originally derived from Illinois Central into its rules governing the regulation of public
streets.
Applying the Arlington Heights test, the inquiry becomes: Is the municipality’s
action affecting its public streets a “reasonable regulation regarding public usage,” an
exercise of its governmental power, or is the action intended primarily to produce
revenue, an exercise of “proprietary power”? Here, simply asking the question suggests
the answer. The entire purpose of the Concession Agreement was to monetize the
revenue streams produced by a particularly lucrative asset—one chosen specifically for
its appeal to investors—thus impairing the ability of subsequent councils to exercise
“governmental powers” and impose “reasonable regulations,” in accordance with public
necessity, safety, and convenience.
In the pending litigation, the city relies extensively, if not exclusively, on the
expansive powers provided “home-rule” municipalities by a 1970 amendment to the
Illinois constitution.198 This amendment grants cities such as Chicago “[the] power to
perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited
to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and
welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.”199 Moreover, the Constitution instructs
courts to “construe[] [such powers] liberally.”200 On the strength of this argument the city
won a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim that “The Concession Agreement Illegally
Leases the City’s Parking Meter System on Public Streets.”201 The city cited in defense of
this position, and the trial court adopted as the basis for its decision, a 1989 Illinois
Supreme Court opinion, Triple A Services v. Rice, which held that “[h]ome rule units
have the same powers as the sovereign, except where such powers are limited by the
general assembly.”202 Thus, the Rice court concluded, “Chicago draws its power to
the municipalities thereof, is a paramount right. The municipality cannot lawfully
perform any acts itself nor permit others to do or perform anything in derogation of this
right of the sovereign people . . . .
Peoples Gas, 413 Ill. at 464.
197
See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 444 (1892).
198
Indeed, the Concession Agreement itself states:
This ordinance is an exercise of the City's power as a home rule unit of local government
under Article VII of the 1970 Constitution of the State of Illinois and is intended to
override any conflicting provision of any Illinois statute that does not specifically
preempt the exercise of home rule power by the City.
J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL., supra note 25, at 50526.
199
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
200
Id. at § 6(m).
201
See First Amended Complaint at 5, Indep. Voters of Ill. v. Lux, No. 09CH-28993 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty.
2009).
202
Triple A Services v. Rice, 131 Ill. 2d 217, 230 (1989); see also Report of the Proceedings at 62, Indep.
Voters of Ill. v. Lux, 09-CH-28993 (Cook Cnty. Ct. filed Aug. 19, 2009) (dismissing the plaintiffs claim
because “[h]ome rule units have the authority to contract . . . . [and] [t]he matter of parking and the
regulation of the City streets are within home rule powers and functions”).
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‘regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare’ directly from
the constitution.”203
The city’s and court’s reliance on the 1970 constitution, however, is misplaced.
First, Arlington Heights, a 1993 opinion, specifically stated that home-rule municipalities
lack proprietary powers over public streets, including the power to “rent or to lease parts,
or all, of a public street.” To the extent that the court’s 1989 Triple A and 1993 Arlington
Heights opinions conflict, the latter presumably prevails. Notwithstanding Arlington
Heights, the city’s reliance on the 1970 constitution fails. Admittedly, under its homerule authority, Chicago enjoys “the same powers as the sovereign.” Illinois Central,
however, specifically imposed limits on the power of the sovereign to alienate public
trust resources. Indeed, substituting the City of Chicago for the State of Illinois in this
context only reinforces the applicability of Illinois Central to the litigation. The city
cannot rely on the home-rule provisions of the state constitution for authority to alienate
public trust resources just as the Illinois legislature could not rely on its supposedly
despotic sovereign power to alienate the submerged lands of the Chicago Harbor.
Finally, Plat Act-related decisions, including Arlington Heights, represent but one
facet of Illinois public trust jurisprudence.204 Assuming Chicago’s municipal streets are
accorded “public trust doctrine” protection, as explicitly stated in the Concession
Agreement, a broader survey of Illinois public trust caselaw is appropriate. Relying on
Supreme Court precedent, including Illinois Central, the Illinois Supreme Court has
implicitly adopted a test for determining whether a grant of public trust property violates
the public trust doctrine. Under the state doctrine, granting rights in such property is not,
per se, impermissible. Rather, the court inquires into whether the grant primarily benefits
the general public or a private party. If the latter, the grant violates the doctrine.205 This
203

See Triple A Services, 131 Ill. 2d at 230.
Illinois courts have interpreted the public trusts articulated in Illinois Central and the Plat Act as
complementary, if not identical. See Mamolella v. First Bank of Oak Park, 97 Ill. App. 3d 579, 582–83
(1981) (noting “[t]he Supreme Court [in Illinois Central] also observed that the title to these navigable
waters was different in character from the State’s title to other public lands, and that, unlike ordinary land
that the State held for sale, the navigable waterways were held in an inalienable public trust. There can be
no doubt that the Chicago lakefront has great value to the people of the State of Illinois. Similarly, the
public has a strong interest in the preservation of public parks.”); see also Paepcke v. Public Building Com.
263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970) (applying Illinois Central to public parks under the Plat Act). In this manner,
courts have applied the rules articulated in Illinois Central to the disposition of public trust property under
the Plat Act.
205
See People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 80 (1976) (rejecting State’s attempt to transfer
certain submerged lands to U.S. Steel Corporation and noting “In order to preserve meaning and vitality in
the public trust doctrine . . . the public purpose to be served cannot be only incidental and remote. . . . [T]he
direct and dominating purpose here would be a private one.”); Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 203
Ill. 2d 312, 328 (2003) (upholding the City Park District’s thirty-year lease of Soldier Field to the Chicago
Bears organization and noting “that Soldier Field will continue to be used as a stadium for athletic, artistic,
and cultural events. With improved parking, the public will gain better access to the stadium, the museums,
and the lakefront generally. The public will now enjoy a fully renovated, multiuse stadium, instead of a
deteriorating 78 year-old facility. These results do not violate the public trust doctrine even though the
Bears will also benefit from the completed project.”); Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
742 F.Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (rejecting transfer of submerged lands in Lake Michigan to Loyola
University although “some aspects are beneficial to the public, the primary purpose of the grant is to satisfy
a private interest.”); People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 157 (1896) (upholding transfer of
certain submerged lands to private parties to fund construction of Lake Shore Drive because the public’s
interest in the lands and waters remaining was not impaired); see also Lake Mich. Fed’n, 742 F. Supp. at
204
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fact-intensive inquiry is similar to the test undertaken in Illinois Central; indeed, it is
undoubtedly derived from Illinois Central where Justice Field wrote, “The control of the
State for the purposes of the [public] trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as
are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without
any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining."206
The Illinois Central test is admittedly subjective. Here, however, the benefit inures
to the private entity, not the general public. The public benefit consists of a cash infusion
of $1.15 billion207 and modest annual savings associated with transferring revenue
collections and system maintenance. This funding allowed the city to delay significant
budget cuts or tax increases for approximately two years,208 an obvious benefit to
Chicago’s citizens and employees. This public benefit, however, must be contrasted with
the public cost. In sum, the city received “half the value” of the concession rights,209
parking rates immediately quadrupled on two-thirds of the city’s meters,210 and the city
sacrificed the right to regulate its streets as public safety, necessity and welfare demand,
without compensating Morgan Stanley for any profits thus impaired.211 On the whole, the
public benefit is marginal.
Conversely, the Agreement is a boon for private investors. According to
Businessweek:
Chicago drivers will pay a Morgan Stanley-led partnership at least $11.6
billion to park at city meters over the next 75 years—10 times what Mayor
Richard Daley received when he leased the system for a one-time sum of
$1.15 billion in 2008. The investors . . . may earn a profit of $9.58 billion
before interest, taxes, and depreciation, according to documents for the
group's $500 million private note sale. Helped along by some aggressive
parking-fee hikes, the group is making a profit (before earnings, taxes, and
depreciation) equivalent to 80 cents per dollar of projected revenue.
Standard Parking, a publicly traded company that runs the parking
concession at the city's O'Hare and Midway airports, earned only 4.84
cents per dollar of revenue last year.212
Accordingly, the public is marginally benefitted, if at all, while Morgan Stanley extracts a
“windfall.” The Concession Agreement thus violates the Illinois Supreme Court’s
contemporary public trust doctrine test.

444 (“The court [in Kirk] found that the transfer did not violate the public trust doctrine because . . . the
project would directly benefit the public.”).
206
See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
207
See J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25 at 50508.
208
See supra note 87.
209
See Report of Inspector General, supra note 19, at 2.
210
Dan Mihalopoulos, Parking Meter Fees to Quadruple, CHI. BREAKING NEWS (Dec. 2, 2008),
http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2008/12/parking-meter-fees-to-quadruple.html.
211
See discussion supra Part II, par. 1–3.
212
Preston, supra note 100.
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CONCLUSION
Private investors are increasingly seeking monopolistic property rights in publicly
owned infrastructure. The monopoly sought by such institutions consists not of an
exclusive possessory right, but of an “exclusive right and franchise” to revenues derived
from the asset. This phenomenon recalls the efforts of nineteenth-century railroad
corporations to acquire special privileges in public streets and harbors, conveyences
which ostensibly protected the public interest by ensurining continued public access to
the encumbered asset. In the “lodestar” of the modern public trust doctrine, Illinois
Central, the Supreme Court prevented a railroad corporation from acquiring monopolistic
property rights in a “common highway for commerce, trade and intercourse,” despite the
public’s continued right of passage over the property.213 The grant, in the Court’s
judgment, empowered a private party indifferent to public safety and welfare to engage in
profit-maximizing, rent-seeking behavior and thus “delay indefinitely the improvement”
of essential public infrastructure. The recent Chicago Parking Meter Concession
Agreement invokes precisely such concerns. By allocating to Morgan Stanley an
exclusive, monopolistic right to revenues derived from the parking meter system, and
requiring the city to pay substantial premiums for the right to exercise regulatory powers
in accordance with public necessity, the Concession Agreement encourages the
stagnation of publicly owned infrastructure vital to Chicago’s economic and urban
development. To this end, Illinois Central specifically, and the public trust doctrine
generally, maintain tremendous potential to proscribe infrastructure privatizations which
demonstrably impair the public interest.

213

Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892).
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APPENDIX
Selected Concession Agreement Provisions

An "Adverse Action" shall occur if the City, the County of Cook or the State of Illinois
(or any subdivision or agency of any of the foregoing) takes any action or actions at any
time during the Term (including enacting any Law) and the effect of such action or
actions, individually or in the aggregate, is reasonably expected (i) to be principally borne
by the Concessionaire or other operators of on-street metered parking systems and (ii) to
have a material adverse effect on the fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest
(whether as a result of decreased revenues, increased expenses or both), except where
such action is in response to any act or omission on the part of the Concessionaire that is
illegal (other than an act or omission rendered illegal by virtue of the Adverse Action) or
such action is otherwise permitted under this Agreement; provided, however, that none of
the following shall be an Adverse Action: (A) any action taken by the City pursuant to its
Reserved Powers, (B) other than as a result of any action taken by the City pursuant to its
Reserved Powers, the development, redevelopment, construction, maintenance,
modification or change in the operation of any existing or new parking facility or mode
of parking or of transportation (including a road, street or highway) whether or not it
results in the reduction of Metered Parking Revenues or in the number of vehicles using
the Metered Parking System, (C) the imposition of a Tax of general application or an
increase in Taxes of general application, including parking Taxes of general application
imposed on customers or operators of parking facilities, or (D) requirements generally
applicable to public parking lot licensees including "public garage-not enclosed"
licensees under the Municipal Code. (b) If an Adverse Action occurs, the Concessionaire
shall have the right to (i) be paid by the City the Concession Compensation with respect
thereto (such Concession Compensation, the "AA-Compensation") or (ii) terminate this
Agreement and be paid by the City the Metered Parking System Concession Value, in
either case by giving notice in the manner described in Section 14.1(c).214
*

*

*

Compensation Event. “Compensation Event” means the Concessionaire’s compliance
with or the implementation of any City Directive or any modified or changed Operating
Standard subject to Section 6.3(b), the occurrence of an Adverse Action or the occurrence
of any other event that under the terms of this Agreement explicitly requires the payment
of Concession Compensation . . . . ‘Concession Compensation’ means compensation
payable by the City to the Concessionaire in order to restore the Concessionaire to same
economic position the Concessionaire would have enjoyed if the applicable
Compensation Event had not occurred, which compensation shall be equal to the sum of
(i) all Losses (including increased operating, financing, capital and maintenance costs but
excluding any costs and expenses that the Concessionaire would otherwise expend or
incur in order to comply with this Agreement or in the ordinary course of the
performance of the Metered Parking System Operations or the carrying on of business in
the ordinary course) that are reasonably attributable to such Compensation Event plus (ii)
214

J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25 at 50619.
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the actual and estimated net losses (after giving effect, to the extent applicable, to any
increase in revenues, including Metered Parking Revenues that are attributable to such
Compensation Event) of the Concessionaire’s present and future Metered Parking
Revenues that are reasonably attributable to such Compensation Event; provided,
however, that, unless otherwise specified in this Agreement, any claim for Concession
Compensation shall be made within 120 Days of the date that the Concessionaire first
became aware of such Compensation Event. Any Concession Compensation payable with
respect to Losses or lost Metered Parking Revenues (or other revenues) that will occur in
the future shall be payable at the time such Compensation Event occurs based on a
reasonable determination of the net present value of the impact of such Compensation
Event (i) over the period ending on February 28, 2015 in the case of the Compensation
Event described in Section 7.1 and (ii) over the remainder of the Term in the case of any
other Compensation Event.215
*

*

*

Required Closure Allowance. “Required Closure Allowance” means (i) with respect to a
particular Concession Metered Parking Space located within the Central Business District
and a particular Reporting Year, eight percent (8%) of the number of Days during such
Reporting Year that such Concession Metered Parking Space was a designated
Concession Metered Parking Space for Metered Parking System Operations, and (ii) with
respect to a particular Concession Metered Parking Space not located within the Central
Business District and a particular Reporting Year, four percent (4%) of the number of
Days during such Reporting Year that such Concession Metered Parking Space was a
designated Concession Metered Parking Space for Metered Parking System Operations
and in either case based upon the assumption that such Concession Metered Parking
Space will continue to be a Concession Metered Parking Space for the remainder of such
Reporting Year.216
*

*

*

Required Closure Payment. “Required Closure Payment” means, with respect to a
Concession Metered Parking Space and for the Quarter during which the Required
Closure Allowance for the Reporting Year is first exceeded and for each subsequent
Quarter during the Reporting Year, an amount of money equal to twenty-five percent
(25%) of the weighted average Revenue Value of such Concession Metered Parking
Space during the Reporting Year multiplied by a fraction the numerator of which is the
number of Days in such Quarter that such Concession Metered Parking Space was closed
as a result of a Required Closure after the date the Required Closure Allowance for such
Reporting Year was fully applied and the denominator of which is the number of Days
that such Concession Metered Parking Space was so designated during such Quarter as a
Concession Metered Parking Space for Metered Parking System Operations, all based
upon the assumption that such Concession Metered Parking Space will continue to be a
215
216

Id. at 50533 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 50548.
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Concession Metered Parking Space with its then current Revenue Value for the
remainder of such Reporting Year.217
*

*

*

Reserved Powers. “Reserved Powers” means the exercise by the City of those police and
regulatory powers with respect to Metered Parking Spaces, including Concession
Metered Parking Spaces and Reserve Metered Parking Spaces, and the regulation of
traffic, traffic control and the use of the public way including the exclusive and reserved
rights of the City to (i) designate the number and location of Metered Parking Spaces and
to add and remove Metered Parking Spaces; (ii) establish and revise from time to time the
schedule of Metered Parking Fees for the use of Metered Parking Spaces; (iii) establish
and revise from time to time the Periods of Operation and Periods of Stay of Metered
Parking Spaces;' (iv) establish a schedule of fines for parking violations; (v) administer a
system for the adjudication and enforcement of parking violations and the collection of
parking violation fines and (vi) establish and administer peak period pricing, congestion
pricing or other similar plans.218
*

*

*

Use of Reserved Powers. The Parties acknowledge and agree that (i) it is anticipated that
the City will exercise its Reserved Powers during the Term, (ii) the impact of certain of
such actions may have a material adverse effect on the fair market value of the
Concessionaire Interest; (iii) the provisions of Article 7, including the provisions thereof
relating to the payment of Settlement Amounts by the City, are designed to compensate
the Concessionaire for changes resulting from the exercise by the City of its Reserved
Powers in a manner that will maintain the fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest
over the Term and (iv) adverse changes may be mitigated by other Reserved Power
actions of the City that will have a favorable impact on the fair market value of the
Concessionaire Interest. The Parties also acknowledge and agree that there may be
circumstances when the exercise by the City of its Reserved Powers may have a material
adverse effect on the fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest that cannot be
compensated fully under the provisions of Article 7 and that under such circumstances
the Concessionaire may seek compensation with respect thereto (the ‘Reserved Powers
Adverse Action Compensation’).219
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Id. at 50549.
Id.
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